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 A B S T R A C T  
The study aims to determine the effect of corporate governance structures: manage-
rial ownership, institutional ownership, independent commissioners, board of com-
missioners’ size, and board of directors’ size on financial distress. It used the sample 
taken from non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) 
for period 2012-2016. This study used a purposive sampling method involving 605 
observations using binary logistic regression analysis techniques. The results show 
that there are significant negative impact between institutional ownership, size of 
board of commissioners and directors on financial distress. However, the results 
confirm that managerial ownership and independent commissioners had no signifi-
cant impact on financial distress 
 
 A B S T R A K  
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui pengaruh corporate governance structure 
yaitu: kepemilikan manajerial, kepemilikan institusional, komisaris independen, uku-
ran dewan komisaris, dan ukuran dewan direksi terhadap financial distress. Adapun 
variabel kontrol penelitian yaitu leverage dan ukuran perusahaan. Sampel yang 
digunakan adalah perusahaan non-keuangan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia 
(BEI) periode 2012 – 2016. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode purposive sampling 
yang melibatkan 605 observasi dengan menggunakan teknik analisis regresi logistik 
biner. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa kepemilikan institusional, ukuran dewan 
komisaris, dan ukuran dewan direksi berpengaruh negatif signifikan terhadap finan-
cial distress, sedangkan kepemilikan manajerial dan komisaris independen tidak ber-
pengaruh signifikan terhadap financial distress. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since rupiah’s weakening against dollar and the 
increase in fuel prices, researchers estimate that 30 
companies had a financial distress situation each 
year from 2010 by seeing negative net-income and 
operational cash flow. Ito Warsito, President Direc-
tor of Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX), stated that 
in 2009 to 2013, 20 companies were delisted from 
the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) where 15 of 
them had a financial distress because of the lack of 
business continuity. 
In addition to external factors, the weakening 
of the country's economic condition, the internal 
factor is, among others, a decline in the company's 
financial condition. Company's financial condition 
can be declared unhealthy if the company has li-
quidity and solvency difficulties (Sudana, 2011). 
Companies with a proportion of debt that are too 
large will have high financial risks and the financial 
statements show a decline. If the company has this 
condition continuously, they will face financial 
distress. Other factors that can make a company 
experience financial distress are mistakes from 
management that occur repeatedly (Sudana, 2011). 
Management's managing inability also has caused 
the company to fail. For that reason, the company 
must be able to identify the factors that cause the 
company's business failure and must have good 
corporate governance to avoid financial distress. 
Corporate governance has received greater at-
tention in Asia since the financial crisis in mid-1997. 
The weak implementation of corporate governance 
is believed to be the main cause of economic inse-
curity which has caused deterioration in economic 
conditions in several Asian countries, including 
Indonesia. Based on the Pricewaterhouse Coopers 
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study published in the Report on Institutional In-
vestor Survey, Indonesia was placed at the bottom 
with China and India with a value of 1.96 for trans-
parency (Kaihatu, 2006). Corporate governance’s 
weakness is an indication of the lengthy recovery 
process of the 1998 economic crisis in Indonesia. 
Corporate governance is mechanisms and 
rules that control an organization or a company in 
achieving their goals to maximize shareholders' 
long-term profits (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2006). According 
to the Forum on Corporate Governance in Indone-
sia, corporate governance is a set of rules that regu-
late relations between shareholders, company 
managers, creditors, governments, employees, and 
other stakeholders related to their rights and obli-
gations, or in other words a system that regulates 
and controls the company. The Organization for 
Economic Corporation and Development (OECD) 
defines corporate governance as a structure for 
setting company goals, suggestions for achieving 
these goals, and for determining supervision of 
company performance. The aim of corporate gov-
ernance is to create added value for all stakehold-
ers. 
This study aims to determine the effect of cor-
porate governance structures: managerial owner-
ship, institutional ownership, independent com-
missioners, board of commissioners size, and board 
of directors size, on financial distress in the Indone-
sian public listed companies. Our study contributes 
to the literature in different way. Previous literature 
analyzes the effect of corporate governance on 
firm’s financial distress and the obtained results are 
different. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
HYPOTHESIS 
Managerial ownership 
Corporate governance issues are motivated by 
agency theory which states that agency problems 
arise when the management of a company is sepa-
rate from its ownership. Managerial ownership can 
reduce agency problems that arise in a company. 
Managerial ownership is the proportion of compa-
ny ownership by management, both directors and 
commissioners. The greater the proportion of own-
ership by management, the greater the manage-
ment's responsibility in managing the company. 
Decisions from management are expected to be a 
decision for the interests of the company. There-
fore, companies can also avoid the potential for 
financial distress. 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), if the 
proportion of managerial ownership is greater, 
then managers will work better to improve perfor-
mance in managing company finances, and more 
consider in making decisions that can harm the 
company. Therefore, the greater the percentage of 
managerial ownership can reduce the possibility of 
companies experiencing financial distress. This is in 
line with the results of research by Elloumi and 
Gueyie (2001) and Abdullah (2006), which show 
that high managerial ownership in companies can 
strengthen the incentives of managers in monitor-
ing management to prevent financial difficulties. 
However, the results of research by Manzaneque, 
Priego and Merino (2015) stated that there was no 
significant effect between managerial ownership of 
the company and the condition of financial difficul-
ties. The hypothesis for managerial ownership var-
iable is arranged as follows: 
H1: Managerial ownership has a negative impact to 
financial distress. 
 
Institutional ownership 
Institutional ownership is the percentage of shares 
held by the institutions of the total outstanding 
shares of the company. The institutions are banks, 
insurance companies, pension funds, and other 
institutional investors. Institutional shareholders 
do not target short-term or annual performance, 
but focus on the long term and help management 
to improve its long-term performance (Donker, 
Santen and Zahir, 2009). 
Institutional shareholders have many ad-
vantages in obtaining and managing information. 
This view is supported by Shiller and Pound (1989) 
stating that institutional investors often analyze 
each investment rather than individual investors, 
so institutional investors can oversee the company 
and make decisions that are more directed and not 
detrimental to the company. Institutional owner-
ship can also reduce management motivation in 
improving their own welfare with close supervi-
sion (Bushee, 1998). This statement is supported by 
the results of Crutchley and Hansen (2015) and 
Abdullah (2006) who stated that institutional own-
ership of the company negatively affected financial 
difficulties. However, in the results of the study of 
Manzaneque, Priego and Merino (2015) actually 
states that there is no significant influence between 
institutional ownership and financial distress. The 
hypothesis for institutional ownership variable is 
arranged as follows: 
H2: Institutional ownership has a negative effect on 
financial distress. 
 
Independent commissioners 
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Independent commissioners appear as part of the 
board of commissioners because the board of 
commissioners has not been able to carry out the 
oversight function properly and independently. 
Independent commissioners are expected to create 
a more objective, independent climate, able to 
maintain stability between the interests of majority 
and minority shareholders. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) explain that the more supervisors, the better 
it will be for the company because it can reduce the 
possibility of agency conflicts and reduce agency 
costs. Elloumi and Gueyie (2001) Manzaneque, 
Priego and Merino (2015) show that the proportion 
of independent commissioners has a significant 
negative effect on the probability of financial diffi-
culties. The high proportion of independent com-
missioners in the company can reduce the possibil-
ity of financial difficulties. Whereas in the study of 
Miglani, Ahmed and Henry (2015) state that there 
is no significant relationship between independent 
commissioners and the possibility of corporate fi-
nancial difficulties. The hypothesis for independent 
commissioner variables is arranged as follows: 
H3: Independent commissioners have a negative effect on 
financial distress. 
 
Board of commissioners size 
The board of commissioners has the ability to su-
pervise and control the management of the compa-
ny. The larger board of commissioners’ size allows 
greater access to information. The information can 
facilitate the board of commissioners in monitoring 
management performance, so that the possibility of 
corporate financial distress will be smaller. 
Wardhani (2006) and Manzaneque, Priego and 
Merino (2015) which shows that a larger board of 
commissioners size can reduce the possibility of 
financial distress. 
The larger board of commissioners has several 
problems in the balance of the company. The board 
of commissioners to prioritize personal interests at 
the expense of the company (Chaganti, Mahajan 
and Sharma, 1985). The larger board size causes a 
lack of effectiveness when economic conditions are 
volatile (Goodstein, 1994). The smaller board size is 
more effective in controlling the company. It can 
reduce the possibility of economic and financial 
instability of the company (Jensen, 1993). Previous 
study states that the board size has a significant 
positive effect on financial distress (Dalton et al., 
1999) . Larger size of the board of commissioners 
causes the probability of financial distress to be 
greater. The hypothesis for the board of commis-
sioner size variables is as follows: 
H4: Board of commissioners size has a positive effect on 
financial distress. 
 
Board of directors’ size 
The board of directors run the managerial and dai-
ly operations of the company. The board of direc-
tors also determines the policies and strategies to 
be taken, both in the short and long term. Size and 
diversity of the board of directors is beneficial be-
cause of the relationship and network’s formation 
with outside parties in ensuring the availability of 
company resources (Pearce and Zahra, 1992). Speci-
fications of each field will be higher so that the 
company's performance can be more optimal. Thus, 
the probability of companies have financial stress 
conditions will be lower. The larger board of direc-
tors’ size in a company, the less likelihood of finan-
cial distress will be happen. However, there are 
differences in the results of previous study. It 
shows that the larger board of directors’ size, the 
higher likelihood company will have financial dis-
tress. The hypothesis for board size variables is 
arranged as follows: 
H5: Board of directors size has a negative effect on finan-
cial distress. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODS  
Sample selection and data collection 
The population in this study were all non-financial 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
in 2012-2016. The sample consist of 605 observa-
tions, 220 observations for health firms and 385 
observations for financially distressed firms. Infor-
mation about composition of shareholders and cor-
porate governance has been taken from annual 
reports. Information about financial data has been 
taken from financial statements. This information is 
available on Indonesia Stock Exchange and compa-
ny’s web page. 
Financial distress is defined as the situation 
where the company's operating cash flow is not 
sufficient to fulfill its current liabilities and the 
company is forced to take corrective action (Wruck, 
1990). Therefore, this study consider as financial 
distress companies those that meet one of the fol-
lowing criteria: (1) Negative net income for three 
consecutive years (Elloumi and Gueyie, 2001); (2) 
Negative net operation cash flow for three consecu-
tive years (Wruck, 1990); (3) Interest coverage ratio 
< 1 for three consecutive years (Claessens and 
Djankov, 1999). 
 
Test specification 
Logistic regression analysis is used to estimate the 
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effect of corporate governance structures on corpo-
rate financial distress. This study applied this anal-
ysis because financial distress, the dependent vari-
able, is dichotomous, as is the case (Hosmer and 
Lemeshow, 1989; Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996). 
Maddada (1991) also states that logistic regression 
is the appropriate analysis procedure where dis-
proportionate sampling from two populations (i.e. 
the financially distressed and healthy population) 
is used. The following logistic regression model are 
used to test the hypothesized relations between 
corporate governance structure (managerial owner-
ship, institutional ownership, independent com-
missioners, board size, and board of directors’ size) 
as the independent variables and financial distress 
as the dependent variable: 
 
FDit = α + β1Man_Ownit + β2Ins_Ownit + 
β3Indp_Comit + β4Com_Sizeit + β5Dir_Sizeit + 
β6Levit + β7Sizeit + ε 
where: FD = Financial Distress (measured as a vari-
able dummy, financially distressed firms are coded 
1 and healthy firms are coded 0); Man_Ownit = 
Managerial Ownership (measured by the percent-
age of shares owned by commissioners and direc-
tors); Ins_Ownit = Institutional Ownership (meas-
ured by the percentage of shares owned by institu-
tion); Indp_Comit = Independent Commissioner 
(measured by the percentage of independent com-
missioners in the board of commissioners); 
Com_Sizeit = Board of commissioners size (meas-
ured by the number of the board of commission-
ers); Dir_Sizeit = Board of directors size (measured 
by the number of the board of directors); Levit = 
Leverage’s firm (measured by total debt to total 
asset) ; Sizeit = Firm Size (measured by the natural 
logarithm of total assets). For more details, it can be 
seen in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Definition and Expected Signs of Variables 
Variables Definition Abbreviation Expected Signs 
Dependent 
variables 
Financial dis-
tress 
Dummy variable, financially distressed firms are coded 
1 and healthy firms are coded 0. 
I consider as financial distress companies those that 
meet one of the following criteria: (1) Negative net in-
come for three consecutive years; (2) Negative net opera-
tion cash flow for three consecutive years; and/or (3) 
Interest coverage ratio < 1 for three consecutive years. 
FD  
Independent 
variables 
a) Managerial 
ownership 
Percentage of shares owned by commissioners and di-
rectors 
(number of shares by commissioners and directorsi,t/ 
number of shares outstandingi,t) 
Man_Own 
 
 
 
 
- 
b) Institutional 
ownership 
Percentage of shares owned by banks, insurance com-
panies, pension funds, and other institutional investors 
(number of shares by banks, insurance companies, pen-
sion funds, and other institutional investorsi,t / number 
of shares outstandingi,t) 
Ins_Own - 
c) Independent 
commissioners 
Percentage of independent commissioners in the board 
of commissioners 
(number of independent commissionersi,t / number of 
the board of commissionersi,t) 
Indp_Com - 
d) Board of 
commissioners 
size 
Number of members in the board of commissionersi,t Com_Size + 
e) Board of 
directors size 
Number of members in the board of directorsi,t Dir_Size - 
Control varia-
bles 
a) Leverage 
 
 
b) Firm size 
 
Ratio of total debt to total asset in the company 
(total debti,t/total asseti,t) 
Natural logarithm of total assets 
 
Lev 
 
 
Size 
 
+ 
 
 
- 
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4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Descriptive analysis and univariate test 
Descriptive statistics and results in mean difference 
test on variables are presented in Table 2. These 
results indicate that financially distressed firms 
have higher proportion than the healthy firms on 
sample (56% for financially distressed firms). At the 
same time, mean of managerial ownership is 2.62% 
of the shares and mean of institutional ownership is 
33.36% of the shares. It indicates ownership by in-
stitutions have a larger proportion than ownership 
by management in the composition of sharehold-
ers. 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Man_Own 605 0.0000 0.5053 0.0262 0.0726 
Ins_Own 605 0.0000 0.6980 0.3336 0.2220 
Indp_Com 605 0.3333 1.0000 0.4398 0.1369 
Com_Size 605 2 9 4.23 1.643 
Dir_Size 605 2 11 4.55 1.720 
Lev 605 0.0002 0.9940 0.4839 0.2298 
Size 605 8.3591 18.3355 14.6446 1.6179 
FD 605 0 1 0.56 0.497 
Source: Author’s own (2018) 
 
The Hosmer and Lemeshow test table, which 
presented in Table 3, shows that the chi-square has 
a significance value greater than the alpha value of 
0.05 (0.124>0.05). It can be concluded that the mod-
el formed able to predict observation data well and 
the model is suitable for use. 
 
Table 3 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 12.667 8 0.124 
 Source: Author’s own (2018) 
 
Table 4 presents the correlation matrix to ex-
amine multicollinearity between independent vari-
ables. The results show that the possible existence 
of multicollinearity between independent variables 
can be ruled out. 
 
Table 4 
Correlation Matrix 
Variables Constant Man_Own Ins_Own Indp_Com Com_Size Dir_Size Lev Size 
Constant 1.000        
Man_Own -0.438 1.000       
Ins_Own -0.444 0.355 1.000      
Indp_Com -0.281 0.111 -0.079 1.000     
Com_size 0.002 0.087 -0.032 0.177 1.000    
Dir_Size 0.132 -0.104 -0.156 0.003 -0.404 1.000   
Lev -0.017 0.137 0.014 0.029 0.096 -0.092 1.000  
Size -0.849 0.262 0.213 -0.031 -0.231 -0.240 -0.185 1.000 
Source: Author’s own (2018) 
 
Table 5 presents the results obtained after the 
application of logistic regression analysis. The coef-
ficient indicates that managerial ownership 
(Man_Own) is not significant on financial distress. 
Thus hypothesis H1 is not accepted. This result 
consistent with the findings of Manzaneque, Priego 
and Merino (2015) although contradicting that ob-
tained by Elloumi and Gueyie (2001) and Abdullah 
(2006). They found a negative significant impact 
between managerial ownership and financial dis-
tress. The insignificance of relationship between 
managerial ownership and financial distress shows 
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that ownership by company management cannot 
yet act as a mechanism in preventing companies 
from financial distress. This is probably due to the 
small percentage of ownership by directors and 
commissioners owned by most sample companies. 
For the variable institutional ownership, the 
result shows that institutional ownership 
(Ins_Own) has a negative significant impact on 
financial distress. It means that the greater propor-
tion of ownership of shares by institution, the 
smaller probability of financial distress, thus ac-
cepting hypothesis H2. This finding is contrary to 
Wardhani (2006), Putri and Merkusiwati (2014), 
and Manzaneque, Priego and Merino (2015) stating 
that there is no significant influence between insti-
tutional ownership and financial distress. Howev-
er, the result is consistent with previous empirical 
evidence (Abdullah, 2006; Crutchley and Hansen, 
2015), institutional ownership of companies has a 
negative effect on financial distress. Institutional 
investors consisting of banks, insurance companies, 
and other institutional investors, oversee manage-
ment’s action and decision making to increase their 
value and reduce the risk of losses due to financial 
distress (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
The result of independent commissioners’ var-
iable (Indp_Com) indicates that variable does not 
have significant impact on financial distress, thus 
hypothesis H3 is not accepted. This finding is con-
sistent with result of Miglani, Ahmed and Henry 
(2015) although contradicting that obtained Elloumi 
and Gueyie (2001); and Manzaneque, Priego and 
Merino (2015), those who find a negative significant 
impact between independent commissioners and 
financial distress. The existence of an insignificant 
relationship between independent commissioners 
and financial distress shows that independent 
commissioners cannot yet act as an effective mech-
anism to prevent companies from financial distress. 
The possibility of the existence of independent 
commissioners in the company is only to fulfill the 
regulations in Indonesia (Wardhani, 2006). 
For the variable board of commissioners size 
(Com_Size), this study obtain the negative signifi-
cant relationship between board size and financial 
distress, thus hypothesis H4 is not supported. It 
means that the greater size of board of commis-
sioners, the smaller probability of financial distress. 
This finding is contrary to that obtained by 
Chaganti, Mahajan and Sharma (1985), Goodstein 
(1994), Dalton et al. (1999), those who find a posi-
tive relationship between board size and financial 
distress. The larger size of the board of commis-
sioners causes a lack of effectiveness when econom-
ic conditions are volatile and requires a strategic 
change (Goodstein, 1994). Larger board of commis-
sioners’ size causes the probability of financial dis-
tress to be greater. However, the result is consistent 
with Wardhani (2006) and Manzaneque, Priego and 
Merino (2015) which shows that the size of board of 
commissioners has a significant negative effect on 
financial distress. 
The coefficient indicates that board of directors 
size (Dir_Size) has a negative significant impact to 
financial distress. It confirms that the larger board 
of directors size, the smaller probability of financial 
distress, thus accepting hypothesis H1. This result 
is supported by the findings of Nur and Emrinaldi 
(2007) and (Bodroastuti, 2009) although contradict-
ing that obtained by Wardhani (2006), those who 
find a positive relationship between board of direc-
tors size and financial distress. This is consistent 
with the argument of Pearch and Zahra (1992), ac-
cording to which companies with larger board of 
directors’ size have the ability to manage company 
performance. Additionally, the specifications of 
each field will be higher, so that the company per-
formance can be more optimal. 
For control variable, leverage (Lev) and com-
pany size (Size) have a significant impact to finan-
cial distress. Leverage has a positive relationship 
with financial distress. This result is consistent with 
Elloumi and Gueyie (2001), Wardhani (2006), and 
Manzaneque, Priego and Merino (2015). The larger 
proportion of debt, the higher possibility of finan-
cial distress will be happen. Company size has a 
negative impact to financial distress. This finding is 
supported by Wardhani (2006) and Putri and 
Merkusiwati (2014). The greater total assets owned 
by the company, the higher level of the company's 
ability to fulfill the company's obligations in the 
future. 
 
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, 
SUGGESTION, AND LIMITATION 
This paper extends prior empirical research on 
financial distress on corporate governance structure 
in context like Canada, United States, Spain, 
Australia, and Malaysia, where overall analysis is 
still lacking. This study investigates the effect of 
Indonesian corporate governance structure on the 
financial distress. 
The result shows that corporate governance 
structure as institutional ownership, size of board 
of commissioners and directors can reduce the 
probability of financial distress. However, manage-
rial ownership and independent commissioner 
have no significant impact on financial distress.  
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This research offers some important implica-
tion for the empirical literature about how corpo-
rate governance can influence on financial distress. 
Companies can pay attention to the proportion of 
share ownership by institution and the number of 
board of commissioners and directors. It can be 
used in setting indicators that affect possibility of 
financial distress. Investors can consider corporate 
governance structure in determining the probabil-
ity of financial distress and sustainability of the 
company in the future. 
The factors of corporate governance structure, 
that have a significant effect on financial distress, 
are only institutional ownership, board of commis-
sioners size, and board of directors size. There are 
still many factors of corporate governance structure 
that affect financial distress. The suggestion for 
further research is that the researchers need to add 
the other factors of corporate governance and fi-
nancial ratio variables to see the feasibility of com-
panies in predicting financial distress. 
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